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Credit Unions, Consolidation and Business Formation: Evidence from Canadian provinces 
 
Abstract 
This study empirically evaluates the impact of consolidation activity in the credit union system on 
the rate of business formation. Drawing on Canadian provincial-level data over the period 1992-
2009, it provides evidence which suggests that consolidation activity is unlikely to hurt business 
formation in the absence of intense competition in the credit market. Specifically, a unit increase in 
credit union assets per working-age (15-64) individual has a negative, but negligible effect on the 
rate of business formation. However, the intensification of competition in the credit union system 
may increase the magnitude of this negative effect. These findings may inform the formulation of 
small business and entrepreneurship policies. In particular, they suggest that competition policies on 
the banking sector warrant greater attention as consolidation activity unfolds in the credit union 
system. 
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Credit Unions, Consolidation and Business: Evidence from Canadian provinces 
1. Introduction 
The consolidation of the financial services industry in North America is an important 
phenomenon that warrants careful attention (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). One of the major 
concerns that it raises is whether increasingly large financial intermediaries in concentrated credit 
markets will systematically curtail small business lending. Concerns along this line are warranted 
because such an outcome may undermine the ability of new and small firms to make significant 
contributions toward innovation, job creation and regional development (Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, 
Howitt and Prantl, 2009; Baumol, 1990; Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Schumpeter, 1934). Since the 
bulk of prior studies have primarily focused on the question of how mergers among federally 
chartered banks impact small business lending (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995; Berger, 
Saunders, Scalise and Udell, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1996; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Francis, Hasan 
and Wang, 2008; Keeton, 1996; Strahan and Weston, 1998), very little systematic evidence is 
available on the patterns and implications of consolidation activity in the community banking 
segment; yet, structural changes in this segment may significantly impact the rate of business 
formation across the communities and regions within the same country.  
This study systematically evaluates the major recent structural changes in the Canadian 
credit union system, and attempts to quantify the impact of consolidation activity on business 
formation. By way of preview, it will be shown that the consolidation of the credit union system is 
unlikely to have a significantly adverse impact on business formation on its own. However, when 
subjected to competition-enhancing policies, a consolidated credit union system may be less 
conducive to new business formation. 
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This study draws on the existing literature on the relationship between the structure of the 
banking sector and small business lending. Central to this research agenda is the question of whether 
a competitive or a concentrated banking sector will increase or decrease credit supply to small 
businesses. Since bank credit is an important source of external finance for young and small firms, 
one may draw conclusions about the potential impact of the banking sector structure on business 
formation from the evidence on the relationship between banking sector structure and small 
business lending. In particular, the evidence suggests that merged banks may reduce the share of 
small business loans in their loan portfolios relative to their pre-merger levels (Berger, Kashyap and 
Scalise, 1995); Berger and Udell, 1996; Keeton, 1996; Peek and Rosengren, 1996).  By extension, 
this implies that the consolidation of the banking sector may inhibit business formation.  
However, Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) suggest that there is a static view 
behind this inference that is incomplete. According to their dynamic view of the effect of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) on small business lending, M&As not only change the strategic focus of 
the merged bank, but also the reaction of other banks to M&A activities in the banking sector. When 
these dynamic effects are taken into account, any bank-size related decline in small business lending 
that is directly attributed to M&As may at least be partially offset by an increase in small business 
lending among lenders in the same market that do not participate in such M&A activities (Berger et 
al., 1998; Craig and Hardee, 2007). If this is so, then the net effect of consolidation activity on 
business formation may be approximately neutral at the macro level. 
This study contributes to the existing literature primarily along two lines. First, it adds to the 
dearth of research on the nature of consolidation activity in the community banking segment by 
systematically analyzing and characterizing the ongoing episode in the Canadian context. Second, it 
provides evidence on the mediating effect of competition on the relationship between the size of the 
5 
 
credit union system and business formation. By focusing on business formation in the Canadian 
context, this study departs from prior studies that primarily focus on the impact of consolidation 
activity on small business lending in the United States (US) (Berger et al., 1995; Berger et al., 1998; 
Berger and Udell, 1996; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Keeton, 1996; Strahan and 
Weston, 1998). Given the well-documented differences in the financial histories of the US and 
Canada, this departure is warranted. 
Until recently, for instance, the US essentially had a unit banking system that prohibited 
inter-state branching (Bordo, 1995). In contrast, Canada has not only long had unlimited branching, 
but its federally chartered banking sector also evolved into a highly concentrated market structure 
long before consolidation activity intensified in the US. Furthermore, it is notable that the recent 
trend in consolidation activity in the North American financial services industry may have more to 
do with the credit union system in Canada relative to the broader banking sector in the US. 
Therefore, the credit union system warrants particular attention in the Canadian context. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section evaluates the major 
structural changes that are currently unfolding in the Canadian credit union system. A theoretical 
framework is then developed to support a number of hypotheses on the relationship between credit 
union structural variables and the rate of new business formation at the regional level. This is 
followed by a description of the data, sample, measures and the statistical methods employed. The 
results are then presented. The final section discusses the key findings and their limitations, and 
concludes by focusing on the policy implications. 
2. Structural Changes in the Canadian Credit Union System 
Figure 1 shows the values of the assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) held by Credit 
Union Central of Canada (CUCC)-affiliated credit unions in nine of the ten Canadian provinces 
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(excluding Québec) over the period 1992-2009. In absolute terms, it is evident that the size of the 
credit union system, as measured by the value of total assets, has been growing over the period of 
study.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Using the core consumer price index (CPI), as defined by the Bank of Canada, and 2002 as 
the base year, the inflation-adjusted asset values of CUCC-affiliated credit unions were computed. 
This is shown in Figure 2.  What is clear is that the nominal and inflation-adjusted asset values of 
CUCC-affiliated credit unions have moved in tandem at least since 1992. This implies that the 
Canadian credit union system has grown in both nominal and real terms. 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Interestingly, the Canadian credit union system has also been growing in relative terms. 
Figure 3 shows credit union asset density, as defined by the value of CUCC-affiliated credit union 
assets per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals, across provinces from 1992 to 2009. It is evident 
that the credit union system has been growing faster than the working-age population in all 
provinces, albeit at different rates. In general terms, the asset values of CUCC-affiliated credit 
unions per 1,000 working-age individuals ranged from CDN$543,325 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador) and $8.7 million (Saskatchewan) in  1992 compared to CDN$1.6 billion (New 
Brunswick) and CDN$19.8 billion (Saskatchewan) in 2009. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 4 shows a time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union asset density. It can be seen that this 
real measure of the relative size of the credit union system conveys the same information as nominal 
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credit union asset density shown in Figure 4; thus, the relative size of the Canadian credit union 
system has increased in both nominal and real terms between 1992 and 2009. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 shows the number of CUCC-affiliated credit unions by province over the same 
period. In absolute terms, there has been a relatively steady decline in the number of independently 
operated credit unions across provinces.  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
To evaluate the trend in the number of credit unions in relative terms, credit union density, 
as defined by the number of (CUCC-affiliated) credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) 
individuals, was computed. This information is conveyed in Figure 6. It is evident that there has 
been a decline in the number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age individuals, albeit at different 
rates across provinces. In general terms, credit union density ranged from 0.05 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Alberta and British Columbia) and 0.32 (Saskatchewan) in 1992 compared to 0.01 
(British Columbia) and 0.10 (Prince Edward Island and British) in 2009.  
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Although the reported data excludes Desjardins-affiliated caisse populaires in Québec, and 
non-CUCC affiliated credit unions/caisse populaires in general, the emerging story is that the 
Canadian credit union system is becoming more concentrated. The salient developments in the 
credit union system may be summarized by the following two empirical observations: (1) credit 
union asset density has been increasing across provinces, and (2) credit union density has been 
decreasing across provinces. Taken together, these facts suggest that a small number of large players  
are playing an important role in the Canadian credit union system.  
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A central question in this study is whether a more concentrated credit union system, as 
implied by the two empirical observations above, will inhibit or foster business formation. Figure 7 
shows that the number of newly registered businesses was either relatively constant or increasing 
between 1992 and 2009 in absolute terms.  
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
However, a much different picture emerges when new business formation is expressed in 
relative terms. Figure 8 shows entry density - as defined by the number of newly registered 
‘employer’ businesses (that maintain a payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the 
owner) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals - by province over the period 1992-2009. It is 
evident that there has generally been a decline in entry density across provinces over this period. For 
instance, entry density ranged from 5.89 (Ontario) and 16.24 (Prince Edward Island) in 1992 
compared to 5.81 (Nova Scotia) and 10.82 (Prince Edward Island) in 2009.  
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
The finding of a downward trend in the rate of new business formation among working-age 
individuals and an apparently upward trend in the concentration of the credit union system suggests 
that concerns about the adverse impact of the latter on business formation are not misplaced. At the 
same time, this time series evidence is only suggestive. To quantify the impact of consolidation 
activity on business formation, a multivariate regression analysis is required. A theoretical 
framework is developed to support such an analysis in the next section. 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
As credit unions become larger, they may lose their comparative advantage in small business 
lending. This is primarily attributed to the tendency of large financial institutions to not only 
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centralize lending decisions, but also place greater emphasis on independently verifiable 
information that new and small firms generally lack (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 
2005; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Furthermore, relatively large credit unions that are finding it 
increasingly costly to provide relationship-based loans may reduce the share of such loans in their 
portfolios if competition intensifies in the credit market; that is, large credit unions may lack the 
incentive to extend credit to new and small firms on favorable terms if competition makes it easy for 
the latter to break away from the relationships they have forged with credit unions (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995).  
Insofar as the growth in credit union asset density reflects the growth and increasing 
dominance of above-average size credit unions, one would expect a negative relationship between 
credit union asset density and the rate of business formation among working-age individuals. 
However, if this relationship is evaluated at the regional level, the dynamic view of consolidation 
activity suggests that there may not be a systematic relationship between credit union asset density 
and business formation (Berger et al., 1998). At the same time, intense competition within the credit 
union system at the regional level may still have an adverse impact on business formation. This 
leads to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: The rate of business formation is not systematically related to credit union 
asset density at the regional level; and 
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a systematically negative relationship between the rate of business 
formation and the credit union asset density increases as competition increases at the 
regional level.  
10 
 
Alternatively, when viewed in isolation, greater competition in the credit union system at the 
regional level may positively impact new business formation (Rogers, 2012).  This is consistent 
with standard economic theory which suggests that competitive markets are likely to yield greater 
quantities of goods at lower prices relative to markets that are dominated by few players. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: The rate of new business formation is positively related to the degree of 
competition in the credit union system at the regional level. 
However, for the same arguments articulated above, hypothesis 2a may be extended in line with 
hypothesis 1b as follows: 
Hypothesis 2b: There will be a systematically negative relationship between the rate of new 
business formation and the degree of competition in credit union system at the regional level 
as credit union asset density increases. 
4. Research Method 
 
4.1. Data and Sample 
To empirically evaluate the hypotheses developed in the previous section, this study draws 
on provincial-level data on credit union structural variables from Credit Union Central of Canada. In 
addition, it draws on provincial-level data on new business registrations from Statistics Canada’s 
Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) file. A number of publicly available Statistics 
Canada tables were also used as data sources for this study. A balanced panel dataset was prepared 
on the variables described below for nine of the ten Canadian provinces over the period 1992-2009. 
This yields 162 province-year observations. 
4.2.Measures 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
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The dependent variable in entry density. This variable was defined above as the number of 
newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age individuals. Entry density serves a 
proxy for the rate of business formation among working-age individuals.  An increase (decrease) in 
entry density implies an increase (decrease) in the supply of credit to new and small firms. 
4.2.2. Credit union structural variables 
Credit union asset density is used to capture both the relative size of the credit union system 
and the growth, and the dominance of above-average size credit unions that are expanding much 
faster than their small counterparts in Canada. Meanwhile, credit union density is used as a proxy 
for the degree of competition in the credit union system. An increase (decrease) in credit union 
density is associated with an increase (decrease) in the degree of competition in the credit union 
system, all else equal. Although general measures of credit market concentration including the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index were considered, their inclusion was precluded due to data 
limitations. 
4.2.3. Control variables 
To mitigate a variety of conflating influences on the relationship between the rate of new 
business formation (entry density) and credit union structural variables (credit union asset density 
and credit union density) in our analysis, a number of control variables are included in the 
multivariate regression models described below. The controls for the demographic characteristics of 
provinces span age, education level, gender and immigration.  
To the extent that age is negatively correlated with risk-taking propensity, or positively 
correlated with human capital (i.e. business experience or organizational skill), provinces with a 
relatively high share of individuals who are above the median age may have a relatively low, or high 
propensity for entrepreneurship, respectively, up to a certain age (Blanchflower, Oswald and 
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Stutzer, 2001; Lévesque and Minniti, 2006; Lévesque, Shepherd and Douglas, 2002; Madsen, 
Neergaard and Ulhoi, 2003). Therefore, the use of provincial median age as a control variable is 
justified. In addition, we also controlled for cross-province differences and temporal changes in 
human capital by using the share of the adult population (age, 25-44) with a Batchelor’s degree as a 
control variable.  This is appropriate based on studies that find a positive relationship between 
formal education and entrepreneurship (Bates, 1990; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Henley, 2005). 
The share of the provincial population that is female is used to control for the influence of 
gender on the relationship between the rate of new business formation and credit union structural 
variables. This is justified because prior studies have found gender-based differences in the 
propensity for entrepreneurship, startup capital, access to finance, among others (Birley, 1989, 
2006; Blanchard, Zhou and Yinger, 2008; Brush, 1992; Kim, 2006; Lee and Rendall, 2001). 
Meanwhile, the share of newly landed immigrants is used to control for the conflating influence of 
immigration on entrepreneurship. This is appropriate because prior studies have found relatively 
high rates of self-employment among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Lofstrom, 2002), while others have 
not found any systematic differences in the rates of self-employment between immigrants and 
natives (Brock and Evans, 1986; Levie and Smallbone, 2007). 
Consolidation activity in the credit union system is a notable phenomenon in an otherwise 
consolidated banking sector. This appears to be the case for the Canadian banking sector where a 
handful of federally chartered banks dominate the financial industry (i.e. Royal Bank of Canada, 
Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce and the National Bank of Canada). An interesting question is whether the consolidation 
activity in the credit union system will adversely impact business formation when combined with a 
large concentrated federally chartered banking sector. At the regional level, consolidation in the 
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credit union system need not significantly inhibit business formation if the small firms that are 
dropped by large or merged credit unions are picked up by small or unmerged credit unions. Bank 
loan density (i.e. federally chartered bank loans per 1,000 working-age individuals) is used as a 
proxy for the relative size of the federally chartered banking sector. As a control variable, it allows 
us to isolate the potentially negative impact that Canada’s concentrated, federally chartered banking 
sector may have on the rate of new business formation both directly, and when combined with 
consolidation activity in the credit union system. 
4.2.4. Statistical Methods 
The fixed-effects estimator is used to estimate the impact of credit union structural variables 
on entry density. At this point, the use of the fixed-effects estimator is justified on the grounds that it 
allows us to control for differences in the unobserved time-invariant characteristics across 
provinces. However, the appropriateness of the fixed-effects estimator as opposed to the random-
effects estimator is formally justified later based on the Hausman test. For each province indexed i, 
the linear panel regression model to be estimated is as follows: 
                                                   
                                                              
                                                                             
                                              
According to hypotheses developed above: credit union asset density will not systematically impact 
entry density (i.e.     ) (hypothesis 1a); combined effect of credit union asset density and credit 
union density on entry density will be negative and statistically significant (i.e.     ) (hypotheses 
1b and 2b; and credit union density will be positively related to entry density (i.e.     ) 
(hypothesis 2a). The vector of controls constitutes the provincial demographic, economic and bank-
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size variables discussed above, as well as province and time fixed effects. The latter two are used to 
control for macroeconomic shocks. 
A number of steps are taken to address expected violations of the standard assumptions that 
underpin the classical linear regression model. Specifically, credit union and federally chartered 
bank structural variables were added in turn to untangle the joint effects that may be induced by 
multicollinearity. Meanwhile, robust standard errors were computed to address a potential violation 
of the assumption that the variance of the error term is constant. Finally, since credit union structural 
variables and entry density are measured contemporaneously, the potential for endogeneity bias in 
the estimation exists. To mitigate endogeneity bias, one-period lagged values of the credit union 
structural variables were used in the multivariate regression model. 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients reported are Table 1. The 
average province has a relatively high standard of living with a real per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) (in 2002 Canadian dollars) of CDN$33,246. In addition, it generates almost 10 
newly registered businesses per 1,000 working-age individuals each year. In the average province, 
50 percent of the population is just below 37 years old, and the male-female ratio is almost 1:1.  In 
addition, the average province receives approximately 9 percent of newly landed immigrants. At 
CDN$16,887 in federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans and CDN$ 5,098 in inflation-
adjusted (CUCC-affiliated) credit union assets per 1,000 working-age individuals, the federally 
chartered banking sector is significantly larger than the credit union system in the average province. 
There are approximately 0.07 CUCC-affiliated credit unions for every 1,000 working-age 
individuals in the average province. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The fixed-effects coefficient estimates are reported in Table 2. Among the control variables, 
a systematic negative relationship seems to exist between entry density and the provincial median 
age variable. The coefficient estimate ranges from -0.634 to -1.036 and are significant at either the 5 
or 10 percent level of significance. Neither immigrant share nor female share seems to 
systematically impact entry density. This also applies to provincial real GDP per capita. 
In general terms, the results are related to the hypotheses in the following way. A marginal 
increase in credit union asset density does not have a statistically significant effect on density in all 
the models considered. This is consistent with hypothesis 1a. However, the evidence weakly 
supports hypotheses 1b/2b; that is, the combined effect of credit union asset density and credit union 
density on entry density may be negative and statistically significant. Meanwhile, competition, as 
captured by credit union density, has a positive effect on entry in the more completely specified 
models. This is consistent with hypothesis 2a.  
The fixed-effects models that generate these results can explain between 76.2 and 77.6 
percent of the within variation in entry density, and between 24.1 and 29.2 percent of the overall 
variation in entry density. However, the fixed-effects estimator may suffer from endogeneity bias. In 
addition, since the strongest support for the hypotheses 1b and 2b come from model 6, it remains to 
be shown why it may be more suitable than the other models. These two issues are addressed in the 
next section. In addition, the coefficient estimates are examined more closely. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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5.3. Additional Robust Checks 
To address the issue of endogeneity, credit union structural variables were lagged one period 
and the panel regression model was re-estimated. The fixed-effects estimates are reported in Table 
3. The Hausman test provides the strongest support for the use of the fixed-effects estimator over 
the random-effects estimator in models 6 and 7 relative to the other model specifications. 
Specifically, the chi-squared distributed Hausman test statistic was 41.06 and 145 for models 6 and 
7, respectively. A p-value of 0.000 was found in both cases. Meanwhile, model 6 can explain 77.8 
and 15.0 percent of the within variation and overall variation, respectively, in entry density; while 
model 7 can explain 78.6 and 15.8 percent of the within variation and overall variation, respectively, 
in entry density. The next competing model in terms of explanatory power is model 5, which can 
explain 78.4 and 21.2 percent of the within variation and overall variation, respectively, in entry 
density. However, taking into account the apparent impact of multicollinearity on the precision with 
which the coefficients were estimated, model 6 appears to yield the most reliable estimates. 
While the inclusion of provincial real GDP per capita does not seem to provide independent 
information that improves the precision of the fixed-effects estimator, its correlation with the other 
regressors introduces bias. This is evident from models 5, 6 and 7. In particular, the inclusion of 
provincial real GDP per capita in models 5 and 7 seems to contribute to the underestimation of the 
marginal effect of credit union density on entry density. Therefore, by dropping provincial real GDP 
per capita in model 6, the fixed-effects estimator yields less biased estimates; hence, it is deemed to 
be the most reliable model specification.  
Focusing on model 6, the estimate of the marginal effects of provincial median age on entry 
density was found to be negative and statistically significant (i.e. estimated coefficient of -0.995 at 
the 5 percent level of significance). While female share and immigrant share relative to the 
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provincial population do not systematically impact entry density, Batchelor’s degree share had a 
statistically significant positive effect on entry density (i.e. estimated coefficient of 0.217 at the 10 
percent level of significance).  
In summary, the results suggest that: (1) credit union asset density does not systematically 
impact entry density (i.e.    = -0.000), which is consistent with hypothesis 1a; (2) the combined 
effect of credit union asset density and credit union density on entry density is negative and 
statistically significant (i.e.    = -0.004, 10 percent level of significant), which is consistent with 
hypotheses 1b and 2b; (3) credit union density has a statistically positive effect on entry density (i.e. 
   = 28.093, 5 percent level of significant), which is consistent with hypothesis 2a 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has addressed the question of whether the expanding and increasingly 
concentrated credit union system in Canada can be expected to foster business formation. It 
contributes to the existing literature by not only confirming some of the findings in prior studies, but 
also in terms of the evidence that it provides on the relationship between the rate of business 
formation and credit union structural variables. In addition, it provides a platform for the 
formulation of coherent policies on the banking sector that have implications for small business and 
entrepreneurship. 
Consistent with prior studies that point to a potentially negative correlation between age and 
risk-taking propensity (Blanchflower et al., 2001), a robust negative relationship was found between 
age and the rate of new business formation among working-age individuals. On the contrary, a 
robust positive relationship was found between the attainment of formal education at the university 
level and the rate of new business formation. This is consistent with prior studies that emphasize the 
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importance of formal education for entrepreneurship (Bates, 1990; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; 
Henley, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the impact of consolidation activity in the Canadian credit union system on 
business formation is less straightforward. The rate at which new businesses are formed by 
working-age individuals is not systematically impacted by the relative size of the credit union 
system. Since much of this expansion is partly attributed to the growth in the asset base of merged 
credit unions, it is possible that small firms that are dropped by large credit unions are picked up by 
smaller ones. This is consistent with the dynamic view of consolidation activity on small business 
lending (Berger et al., 1998).  
Similar to prior studies, competition seems to foster business formation (Roger, 2012). 
However, if competition intensifies in an increasingly concentrated credit union system, business 
formation may progress at a slower rate. Thus, while competition seems to create credit market 
conditions that apparently make it easier for new and small firms to gain better access to credit, it 
may lead some credit unions to curtail small business lending. The latter may stem from the 
potentially high cost of retaining members in a highly competitive environment. 
6.1. Limitations 
There are two limitations that must be borne mind when evaluating the results in this study. 
First, as with any study that draws on aggregate data to estimate the relationship between banking 
sector structural variables and business formation, the potential for endogeneity bias in the 
estimation is a concern.  Although one-period lagged values of credit union structural variables were 
used to mitigate endogeneity bias in the estimation, it remains a concern. Therefore, the estimated 
effects of credit union structural variables on entry density should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, data limitation precluded the use of general measures of credit market concentration such as 
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the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index in this study. At the same time, this does not seem to lead to 
qualitatively different results when compared to prior studies that use this measure along with per 
capita bank-size measures that are similar to the credit union density measure of competition that is 
used in this study (Roger, 2012). 
6.2. Policy Implications 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study presents findings that are relevant for the 
formulation of small business and entrepreneurship policy. In particular, it contributes to the 
ongoing discourse on the merit of a level playing field for federally chartered banks and credit 
unions. This is partly informed by standard competition-efficiency arguments, and the elimination 
of the exclusive tax benefits that credit unions have traditionally enjoyed is one way to create a level 
playing field in the banking sector. However, this study offers preliminary evidence which suggests 
that competition-enhancing policies along this line should be explored in more detail given the 
potentially adverse implication for young and small firms in a concentrated credit union system.  
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Figure 1. A time plot of credit union assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) by province over the 
period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince 
Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; 
Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia, BC. Source: Credit Union Central of 
Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 2. A time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union assets (in millions of Canadian dollars) by 
province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, 
NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, 
MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia, BC. Source: Credit Union Central of 
Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 3. A time plot of credit union assets (in thousands of Canadian dollars) per 1,000 working-
age (15-64) individuals (“credit union asset density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The 
nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, 
PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; 
Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 4. A time plot of inflation-adjusted credit union assets (in thousands of Canadian dollars) per 
1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals (“inflation-adjusted credit union asset density”) by province 
over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and 
Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; 
Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union 
Central of Canada (CUCC). 
 
26 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A time plot of the number of credit unions by province over the period 1992-2009. The 
nine provinces covered are: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova 
Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, 
and British Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A time plot of the number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals 
(“credit union density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as 
follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New 
Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British 
Columbia; BC. Source: Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC). 
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Figure 7. A time plot of the number of newly registered ‘employer’ businesses – defined by the 
maintenance of a payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the owner - by province over 
the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; 
Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; 
Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British Columbia; BC. Source: Longitudinal Employment 
Analysis Program (LEAP) file, Statistics Canada. 
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Figure 8. A time plot of the number of newly registered ‘employer’ businesses (that maintain of a 
payroll for at least one listed employee who may be the owner) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) 
individuals (“entry density”) by province over the period 1992-2009. The nine provinces covered 
are as follows: Newfoundland and Labrador, NL; Prince Edward Island, PEI; Nova Scotia, NS; New 
Brunswick, NB; Ontario, ON; Manitoba, MB; Saskatchewan, SK; Alberta, AB, and British 
Columbia; BC. Source: Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) file, Statistics Canada. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations, 1992-2009. 
 
 Mean SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Entry density a  9.639  
 
  2.787  
 
- 
     
2. Provincial median age 36.793 
 
 2.681  
 
-0.352*** -     
3. Female share b 
 
49.774 
 
 0. 545  
 
-0.108 0.662*** -    
4. Batchelor’s degree 
share c  13.768 
  
 3.145  
 
-0.449*** 0.529*** 0.011 -   
5. Immigrant share d  9.308 
 
 16.476 
 
-0.410*** -0.053 0.026 0.455*** -  
6. Bank loan density e 16,887 6,975 
 
-0.149+ -0.228** -0.195* 0.360*** 0.772*** - 
 
7. Provincial real GDP 
per capita 33,246 11,790 
 
-0.206** 0.374*** -0.282*** 0.728*** 0.183* 0.191* 
 
8. Credit union asset 
density f 5,088 4,487 
 
-0.051 0.073 -0.283*** 0.234** -0.147+ -0.211** 
 
9.     Credit union density g 0.074 0. 060 
 
0.201* -0.282*** -0.078 -0.422*** -0.346*** -0.436*** 
          
       7. 8. 9. 
7. Provincial real GDP 
per capita  
 
   
 
   -   
 
8. Credit union asset 
density f   
 
   
 
   0.273*** -  
9. Credit union density g  
 
 
 
   -0.321*** 0.393*** - 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001; number of province-year observations, n = 162. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given   
  province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
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Table 2. Effects of credit union asset density and credit union density on entry density, 1992-2009. 
This table reports the fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the marginal and joint effects of credit union asset density 
and credit union density on entry density 
a
. Starting with a baseline regression model that includes a standard set of 
control variables, credit union structural variables are subsequently added to yield more completely specified regression 
models. All variables are contemporaneously measured. Robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients are 
reported in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
 
 
Provincial median age  
-0.707
*
 
(0.230)
 
-0.990
*
 
(0.386) 
-1.036
*
 
(0.346) 
-0.634* 
(0.207) 
-0.988
*
 
(0.401) 
-0.817
*
 
(0.348) 
-0.992
+
 
(0.348) 
 
 
Female share 
b
 
 
-0.556 
(0.680) 
0.020 
(0.991) 
0.146 
(0.868) 
-0.808 
(0.624) 
-0.130 
(1.150) 
-0.895 
(0.851) 
-0.135 
(1.084) 
 
 
Batchelor’s degree share c 
0.305 
(0.168) 
0.237 
(0.137) 
0.233 
(0.139) 
0.296 
(0.160) 
0.199 
(0.118) 
0.190 
(0.118) 
0.200 
(0.130) 
 
Immigrant share 
d
 
-0.153
*
 
(0.048) 
-0.116
+
 
(0.059) 
-0.114
+
 
(0.061) 
-0.151
*
 
(0.046) 
-0.099 
(0.056) 
-0.080 
(0.052) 
-0.098 
(0.062) 
 
Provincial real GDP per 
capita 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Bank loan density 
e
 
 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
**
 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union asset density 
f
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union density 
g
   
1.614 
(2.883)  
15.103 
(10.192) 
22.207
*
 
(9.417) 
15.409 
(10.399) 
 
Bank loan density*credit 
union asset density       
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Credit union asset  
density*credit union density    
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003
+
 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Controls for province & 
time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 
59.709
+
 
(27.854) 
41.583 
(37.434) 
36.643 
(32.327) 
70.283
*
 
(25.587) 
48.630 
(44.532) 
81.399
*
 
(31.409) 
48.891 
(40.342) 
R
2
:               within 0.762 0.771 0.771 0.764 0.776 0.768 0.776 
     overall 0.241 0.269 0.272 0.247 0.292 0.254 0.288 
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given   
  province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
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Table 3. Effects of credit union asset density and credit union density on entry density, 1992-2009. 
This table reports the fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the marginal and joint effects of credit union asset density 
and credit union density on entry density 
a
. Starting with a baseline regression model that includes a standard set of 
control variables, credit union structural variables are subsequently added to yield more completely specified regression 
models. Credit union asset density and credit union density are lagged one period relative to the contemporaneously 
measured dependent and the control variables. Robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
 
 
Provincial median age  
-0.740
*
 
(0.219) 
-1.142* 
(0.424) 
-1.201
**
 
(0.356) 
-0.580
**
 
(0.171) 
-1.129
*
 
(0.405) 
-0.995
*
 
(0.378) 
-1.164
*
 
(0.478) 
 
 
Female share 
b
 
 
-0.290 
(0.624) 
0.524 
(0.997) 
0.690 
(0.788) 
-0.840 
(0.473) 
-0.319 
(1.049) 
-0.272 
(0.826) 
-0.282 
(1.035) 
 
 
Batchelor’s degree share c 
0.346
+
 
(0.180) 
0.260
+
 
(0.129) 
0.257
+
 
(0.130) 
0.331
+
 
(0.163) 
0.220
+
 
(0.083) 
0.217
+
 
(0.104) 
0.233
+
 
(0.114) 
 
 
Immigrant share 
d
 
-0.091
+
 
(0.048) 
-0.106 
(0.058) 
-0.086 
(0.048) 
-0.144 
(0.042) 
-0.061 
(0.041) 
-0.044 
(0.041) 
-0.054 
(0.049) 
 
 
Provincial real GDP per 
capita 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Bank loan density
 e
 
 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
+
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
*
 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union asset density 
f
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
Credit union density 
g
   
 
1.862 
(3.418)  
22.316 
(12.247) 
28.093
*
 
(11.582) 
26.243
+
 
(13.239) 
 
Bank loan density*credit 
union asset density       
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Credit union asset 
density*credit union density    
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004
+
 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Controls for province & 
time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 
46.838 
(25.453) 
21.559 
(36.468) 
15.123 
(28.273) 
69.777
**
 
(19.215) 
30.725 
(39.324) 
55.976
+
 
(29.101) 
32.824 
(37.785) 
R
2
:         within 0.755 0.772 0.772 0.761 0.784 0.778 0.786 
overall 0.238 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.212 0.150 0.158 
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001. 
a
 number of newly registered employer businesses per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
b
 percentage of provincial population that is female.  
c
 percentage of the provincial population (age, 25 to 44) with a Batchelor’s degree. 
d
 province’s share in total newly landed immigrants. 
e
 federally chartered inflation-adjusted bank loans per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
f
 inflation-adjusted credit union assets (thousands, CDN$) per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals. 
g
 number of credit unions per 1,000 working-age (15-64) individuals in a given province. 
